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Abstract
Due to lack of situational awareness, automated analysis, poor visibility, and mechani‐
cal switches, today's electric power grid has been aging and ill‐suited to the demand for
electricity, which has gradually increased, in the twenty‐first century. Besides, the global
climate change and the greenhouse gas emissions on the Earth caused by the electricity
industries, the growing population, one‐way communication, equipment failures, energy
storage problems, the capacity limitations of electricity generation, decrease in fossil fuels,
and resilience problems put more stress on the existing power grid. Consequently, the
smart grid (SG) has emerged to address these challenges. To realize the SG, an ad‐
vanced metering infrastructure (AMI) based on smart meters is the most important key.
Keywords: advanced metering infrastructure, communications, security, smart grid,
smart meters
1. Introduction
An electric power grid is a network of power generators, transmission lines, transformers, and
distribution/relay systems to provide its consumers (residential, industrial, and commercial)
with the power they need. Currently, electrical energy is generated in centralized power plants
and transported over a long‐distance transmission network to distribution networks before
reaching the end consumers via communication and power flows in only one direction, i.e.,
from power plants to the customers, which is collectively called an electric grid. After many
decades of development, it has been realized that various utilities can interconnect to achieve
© 2016 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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greater reliability of overall power system by compensating for unexpected failures as well as
disconnections from power devices, i.e., transmission lines and generators.
In an electric grid, generation, transmission, and distribution of power should be precisely
coordinated. Figure 1 depicts various sections in today's electric grid, which consists of four
areas that are generation, transmission, distribution, and customers [1]. Generation involves
the production of electricity from energy sources such as wind and solar farms, coal plants,
and hydroelectric dams. Because generators cannot be located too close to population centers
for safety, legal, and financial reasons, the electric grid needs transmission lines to carry the
electricity over long distances (often more than hundreds of miles). Distribution includes
taking the electricity from transmission lines and delivering it to the customers. Typically, an
electricity distribution system includes medium voltage power lines (below 50 kV), substa‐
tions, and transformers, starting at the transmission substations and ending at the meters of
customers. A substation consists of a bus to split up the power into different regions, step‐
down transformers, relays, and circuit breakers, which are designed to disconnect the substa‐
tion from different distribution lines or from the power grid when necessary. The same
transmission substation can deliver the power at different voltages to different regions, and
the power might be further stepped down in several stages to reach 7200 V. A transformer is
used to reduce voltage from 7200 to 240 V at each customer site. Two wires from the trans‐
Figure 1. Typical electric power grid [1].
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former are used to connect to power meters at a building or house, each carrying 120 V. These
two wires are 180° out of phase, resulting in 240 V, which allows customers to use both 240
and 120 V appliances.
Due to the lack of situational awareness and automated analysis, today's electric power grid
has been aging and ill‐suited to the fast growing demand for electricity in the twenty‐first
century [2]. For example, in the United States, the consumption and demand for electricity
have increased by 2.5% annually over the past 20 years [3]. Besides, the global climate change
and greenhouse gas emissions on the Earth caused by the electricity and transportation
industries [4] put more stress on the existing power grids. Consequently, a new concept of
next‐generation electric power system is urgently needed to address these challenges, which
motivates the proposal of smart grid (SG).
The SG can be viewed as a superposition of communication networks on the electric grids.
Hence, it can improve efficiency, reliability, safety, and security of electricity supply to the
customers, with a seamless integration of renewable and alternative energy sources, such as
photovoltaic systems, wind energy, biomass power generation, tidal power, small hydropow‐
er plants, and plug‐in hybrid electric vehicles, through automated control and modern
communications technologies [5]. In SG, various components in these four areas of the electric
grid are linked together via two‐way communications and power flows to provide interoper‐
ability among them. Thus, consumers can not only draw power but also supply surplus power
to the grid using smart meters that enable monitoring and measuring of these bidirectional
flows. This new infrastructure could potentially produce millions of alternate micro‐energy
sources and allow improved load balancing through instantaneous electricity demand
information exchanges, which could help power plants match their output to demand with
the help of information generated from metering, sensing, and monitoring.
To realize the SG, an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) based on smart meters is the
most important key. The AMI is the system that collects and analyzes data from smart meters
using two‐way communications, and giving intelligent management of various power‐related
applications and services based on that data. The AMI is the deployment of a metering solution
with two‐way communications to the electric meter. The implementation of AMI is widely
seen as the first step in the digitalization of the electric grid control systems. Recently, AMI
has gained great attraction in both industry and commerce due to the accurate improvement
in online meter reading and control. The AMI is the architecture for automated two‐way
communications between smart utility meters and utility companies. The AMI includes smart
meters, e.g., electric, gas, and heat meters, at customer premises, access points, communication
backbone network between customer and service providers, and data management systems
to measure, collect, manage, and analyze the data for further processing. The smart meter can
identify power consumption in much more detail than a conventional meter and periodically
send the collected information back to the utility company for load monitoring and billing
purposes. Besides, the data from smart meter readings are also critical for the control center
to implement Demand/Response mechanism. By using smart meters, customers can control
their power consumption and manage how much power they are using, particularly managing
the peak load. Hence, through customer participation, the utility companies can likely provide
Advanced Metering Infrastructure Based on Smart Meters in Smart Grid
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/63631
39
electricity at lower and even rates for all their customers, and the consequent carbon dioxide
emission will decrease. Despite the increase in the utilization of AMI, there has been very little
assessment or research and development effort to identify the security needs for such systems.
Hence, the aim of this chapter is to offer a comprehensive description about AMI based on
smart meters in SG. In addition, the issues on security, major challenges, and solutions in AMI
in SG are also proposed.
2. Smart meter architecture
Smart meter is an advanced energy meter that supports two‐way communications compared
with a conventional energy meter. Hence, it can measure the energy consumption data of a
consumer and then transmits added information to the utility companies to support decen‐
tralized generation sources and energy storage devices, and bill the customer accordingly.
Besides, smart meters can receive information about electricity price and commands from
utility companies and then deliver them to consumers. In practice, smart meters can read
energy consumption information of customers in real time, such as values of voltage, frequen‐
cy, and phase angle, and then they securely communicate the information to control centers.
By using bidirectional communication of data, smart meters can collect information regarding
the electricity consumption values of customer premises. Data collected by smart meters is a
combination of parameters such as a unique meter identifier, timestamp of the data, and the
electricity consumption values. Based on the information, smart meters can monitor and
execute control commands for all home devices and appliances at the customer's premises
remotely as well as locally. Besides, smart meters can communicate with other meters in their
reach using home area network (HAN) to collect diagnostic information about appliances at
the customer as well as the distribution grid. Moreover, smart meters can be programmed such
that, only power consumed from the utility grid is billed whereas the power consumed from
Figure 2. Architectural model of conventional energy meter and smart meter.
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the distributed generation sources or storage devices owned by the customers is not billed. As
a result, they can limit the maximum electricity consumption, and can terminate or reconnect
electricity supply to any customer remotely [6]. Figure 2 shows an architectural model of a
conventional energy meter and a smart meter.
A smart meter system includes various control devices and sensors to identify parameters and
situations in SG and then it transfers the collected data to the control center or provides
command signals to the devices in the home of customers. The collected electricity consump‐
tion data from all devices of customers on a regular basis helps the utility companies to manage
electricity demand/response more efficiently and also to provide useful information to the
customers about the cost‐efficient methods to use their appliances. Besides, smart meters can
be programmed to maintain a schedule for operation of the home devices and control operation
of other appliances accordingly, i.e., to control light, heat up water in swimming pool, air
conditioning, washing machine, and other appliances [7]. In addition, by integrating smart
meters in electricity grid, utility companies can detect and identify electricity theft and
unauthorized consumption in view of improving the power quality and distribution efficiency
[8]. Hence, smart meters would play an extremely important role in monitoring the perform‐
ance and the energy usage characteristics of the load on the electricity distribution grid in the
future.
Typically, smart meters implement two major functions, which are communication and
measurement [9]. Hence, each meter is equipped with two subsystems as communication and
metrology, respectively. The communication part includes security and encryption that define
the suitable data transmission approach. The metrology varies depending on multiple
characters such as measured phenomenon, technical requirements, region, accuracy, applica‐
tions, and level of data security. Regardless of the type or quantity of their measurement, smart
meters should have six basic functionalities as mentioned [10], which include the following:
Quantitative measurement: Smart meters have to accurately measure the quantity of the
medium by using various topologies, physical principles, and approaches.
Control and calibration: Smart meters should be providing ability to compensate the small
variations according to each system type.
Security communication: The meters have ability receiving operational commands and
sending stored data as well as upgrades for its firmware trustworthily.
Power management: Smart meters have to help the system to exactly maintain its functionality
when the primary source of energy is lost.
Display: Smart meters will send and display information usage of electricity energy to
customers for billing in real time. Besides, the information of real time consumption displayed
on smart meters helps customers to manage their demand efficiently.
Synchronization: Typically, smart meters transmit data of customers to the collector systems
or central hubs for billing and data analysis. Hence, timing synchronization is very important
for reliable transmission of data, particularly in case of wireless communication.
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As a result, based on smart meters, utility companies can provide highly reliable, readily
accessible, flexible, and cost‐effective energy services to their consumers by combining
advantages of both small distributed power generators and large centralized generators.
Moreover, demand side management techniques require that these companies have to collect
large quantity of data from smart meters in real time. One of key components to implement
this concept is advanced metering infrastructure, which collects and analyzes data from smart
meters, and gives intelligent management of various power‐related applications and services
based on that data. In next section, we present AMI based on smart meters.
3. AMI based on smart meters in SG
3.1. AMI architecture
AMI is a main mechanism for the realization of other smart grid applications to deliver
operational and business benefits across the utility. AMI is the system that collects and analyzes
data from smart meters using two‐way communications between user domain and utility
domain, and gives intelligent management of various power‐related applications and services
based on that data. The implementation of AMI is widely seen as the first step in the digitali‐
zation of the electric grid control systems. AMI's main functionalities encompass power
measurement facilities, assisting adaptive power pricing and demand side management,
providing self‐healing ability, and interfaces for other systems. Recently, AMI has gained great
attraction in both industry and academia due to the accurate improvement in online meter
reading and control. AMI helps for financial benefits, improved services, and opportunities
for consideration of environmental concerns.
Figure 3. AMI overview architecture.
The AMI includes smart meters, e.g., electric, gas, and heat meters, at customer premises, access
points, communication backbone networks between customers and service providers, and
data management systems to measure, collect, manage, and analyze the data for further
processes. These AMI components are usually located in various networks [11] and different
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realms such as public and private ones [12]. In AMI systems, smart meters are regarded as the
key interfaces for physical, information, and social domains of the smart grid. Figure 3 shows
AMI overview architecture that is integrated in a broader context of power generation,
transmission, distribution, and customer using HAN, neighborhood area network (NAN), and
wide area network (WAN).
From this figure, we can see that the smart meter is a key device for consumers because it is
responsible for monitoring and recording power consumption of home appliances. HAN
provides connections between home appliances, other integrated systems such as rooftop
photovoltaic system, distributed sensors, plug‐in electric vehicle/plug‐in hybrid electric
vehicle, in‐home display (IHD), smart thermostat, etc., and the smart meter. For communicat‐
ing among these constituents, power line communications (PLCs) or wireless communications,
such as ZigBee, 6LowPAN, Z‐wave, and others can be utilized. NAN provides communication
links between a number of individual smart meters and a data concentrator using WiMAX or
cellular technologies. A number of data concentrators are connected to a central system (it also
is called an AMI headend) in the utility side through WAN. Typically, WAN consists of two
interconnected networks, i.e., the core networks and backhaul networks. The core networks
provide connections to the control center and commonly use fiber optics or cellular networks
to guarantee high data rates and low latency. The backhaul networks handle the broadband
connections to NANs and monitoring devices. Applying cognitive radio (CR) technology in
backhaul networks contributes to reducing the cost for investment and enhancing the flexi‐
bility, capacity, and coverage. Typically, the AMI headend, which is located in the utility side,
includes geographic information system (GIS), configuration system, meter data management
system (MDMS), etc. These subsystems can utilize a local area network (LAN) for intercom‐
munication. In the next section, we present detail in AMI communications infrastructure.
3.2. AMI communications infrastructure
In AMI, the smart meter can identify power consumption in much more detail than a conven‐
tional meter and periodically send the collected information back to the utility company for
load monitoring and billing purposes. In addition, the data from smart meter readings are also
critical for the control center to implement demand response mechanisms. Using smart meters,
customers can control their power consumption and manage how much power they are using,
particularly managing the peak load. Hence, through customer participation, the utility
companies can likely provide electricity at a lower rate for all their customers, and the
consequent carbon dioxide emission will be decreased. Typically, existing AMIs collect data
from smart meters and sensors with intervals of 15 min, the collected data are huge and
important, and it is estimated that a moderately sized city with 2 million homes could generate
22 GB of meter data every day [13], and is referred to as “Big Data,” easily overwhelming best
planned data center capacity in a fairly short time. In particularly, MDMS with the analytical
tools is considered the central module of the management system. Besides, MDMS has to
ensure complete and accurate Big Data from customer to the management modules under
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possible interruptions at lower layers by performing validation, estimation and editing on the
AMI data. Moreover, the distribution network automation system, which collects up to 30
samples per second per sensor for real‐time control of SG [14], third‐party systems, such as
storages or distributed energy resources, connected to the grid, and asset management system
responsible for communication among central command are also sources created Big Data in
SG. As a result, the communication backbone networks should be reliable, secure, scalable,
and cost‐effective enough to meet the requirements in terms of bandwidth and latency to
communicate the data.
In [15], by deploying an AMI, reliability, operational efficiency, and customer satisfaction can
be achieved. This chapter also suggested several additional benefits gained in the AMI, such
as managing power quality and asset management to improve service of the utility company.
However, a robust communication backbone for the AMI data transmissions was not provided
in the chapter. In particular, the AMI communication models include thousands of smart
meters, multiple access points, and a mesh network, which is formed between smart meters
for data routing purposes using industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) frequency bands.
Meanwhile, the aggregated data are routed to the utility company by access points mostly
using licensed bands. The reliability and security of data communications between AMI
components suffer from crowded and noisy ISM bands in urban areas. Packet losses, per‐
formance degradation, latency, and signal interferences are some of the consequences of
heterogeneous spectrum characteristics of the crowded wireless communications. Moreover,
the use of licensed bands to communicate the data between access points and utility companies
requiring extra costs, which is another obstacle to deploy AMI in SG. Consequently, providing
a robust communication backbone is sometimes hardly achievable, and it also comes with
some obstacles for implementation of AMI in SG.
Several works investigated integrated communication technologies for the communication
backbone of AMI. For example, mesh, Ethernet, and cellular AMI network topologies for SG
have been proposed in [16–18]. In [16], the authors proposed mesh networks with a transmis‐
sion architecture based on ZigBee, because the ZigBee protocol was integrated into smart
meters by many AMI vendors, such as Itron, Elster, and Landis Gyr. The operation of ZigBee
under an unlicensed spectrum makes it easy to implement network, being a standardized
protocol based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. Nevertheless, ZigBee also has its own disad‐
vantages, i.e., the transmission distance is limited, the rate of data transmission is low, and the
capability to penetrate the barriers is weak due to non‐line‐of‐sight transmission. Moreover,
ZigBee may cause interferences to other appliances, which operate in the identical 2.4 GHz
ISM frequency band, such as IEEE 802.11 wireless local area networks (WLANs), WiFi,
Bluetooth, and Microwave. Inefficiencies of AMI based on ZigBee will arise when transmission
distances increase. High levels of internetwork coordination are necessary in the deployment
of new mesh networks. Improved alternatives of AMI mesh networks utilize IEEE 802.11 (a,
b, g, n) protocols. However, such networks only support transmission distances ranging from
50 to 200 m, which is also problematic for robust metropolitan area coverage. To increase the
transmission distances in the metropolitan areas and security of data communications between
AMI components, in [17], the authors discussed communication infrastructure based on
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Ethernet. The proposed method can support automated meter readings, customer home
appliance connections, distribution automation, and substation automation. However, AMI
based on Ethernet is not always affordable. In addition, the wireline systems can be challenging
to rapid redeployment, particularly in emergency situations. To overcome this problem, the
authors in [18] proposed a framework for Radio frequency (RF) mesh networking interfaced
with high‐speed access networks such as WiMAX. In the framework, the AMI smart meters
are capable of two‐way communications over a 900 MHz wireless mesh network back to a
collection point at the substation. A private high‐speed access network, which typically can be
fiber or an existing cellular network such as WiMAX, will be then utilized to connect the
substation to the corporate network. However, the AMI network topology based on cellular
network or fiber for SG brings in extra costs to the utility companies and customers. Especially,
the AMI interfaces for future proprietary protocols were not proposed in the framework.
Ideally, AMI interfaces should be upgraded via software without hardware modifications to
save time and cost.
4. Security in AMI
AMI security is required to protect both communication networks and power grid, because
these two systems need to ensure their availability of access as well as survivability in different
scenarios. However, the security of communication networks and power grid differ in several
ways. In a communication network, latency needs to be limited and bandwidth needs to be
guaranteed, whereas data manipulation (placement of false data), destruction of data, and
unauthorized access should be prevented. On the other hand, security of a power grid needs
to ensure reliability, power quality, and stability. Despite these differences, security between
the two systems must be coordinated because the power grid and communication network
can be used to launch attacks against each other. For instance, because the power supply in
SG will be controlled by instantaneous users, information, manipulation of usage data could
create a fictitious grid imbalance leading to voltage variations that can create large‐scale
failures. Similarly, if the state information of the grid is poisoned, the grid could be de‐
stabilized with a potential for physical damage. Physical damage could occur through
overheating of transformers and relays or through voltage fluctuations in appliances. Due to
the critical role of AMI in the SG, AMI security is special importance for the security of the SG.
Given importance in AMI security, in [19] the authors discuss the security issue from two major
aspects: maintaining the privacy of consumer's information and resilience of system against
cyber or external attacks. Besides, the authors in [20] propose security in AMI using key
management scheme for communication system. We can summarize these aspects as follows.
4.1. Privacy of end user's information
In AMI, smart meters are capable of collecting information of customers in every 15 min.
However, current technologies even allow for collecting the data with intervals of minute [21].
Hence, if attackers analyze the data, they can achieve “consumer profiling” with an alarmingly
high accuracy, for example, they know how many people live in the house, type of devices,
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duration of occupancy, ability of security and alarming systems. The profiling allows the
attackers to extract behavior of customers without the need of using computer‐aided tools or
sophisticated algorithms. The authors in [21] have shown that they can identify the use of major
devices in a house of customer by analyzing cumulative energy consumption data from the
smart meter with a 15 min interval. Molina‐Markham et al. [22] use the current general
statistical schemes to identify the usage pattern from AMI data, which is valuable to third
parties, such as entertainment agencies, insurance companies, and government authorities. In
AMI of SG, you can access the network data using your name and address information
collected and stored for billing purpose. From the detailed information, the process can
backfire if it is used without your consent.
To discuss the importance of privacy, it is necessary to consider electrical behavior of an
appliance while it is operating, which is defined as load signature (LS) because each appliance
has different measurable behaviors. For example, consumption behavior of each electrical
appliance is a signature, which could be measured at meter point. Typical variables are current,
voltage, and power or energy. To protect the customers’ privacy, a common method is to make
it impossible for unauthorized parties to differentiate between load patterns and signatures.
The authors in [23] proposed “load signature moderation” technique to facilitate customers’
privacy protection by reshaping the overall pattern of data to make differentiating between
load patterns and signatures impossible. This technique combines three methods, which are
smoothing, hiding, and mystifying consumption, utilizing cooperation of grid and storage/
battery as power source. The method is also defined as “undetectability” in [24].
4.2. Security against external cyber or physical attacks
The AMI‐Sec Task Force, which is formed by security domain experts, industry leaders and
standards bodies, developed the requirements for AMI security [25]. It provides guidance and
security controls to organizations developing or implementing AMI solutions. According to
the report in [25], security requirements for AMI system include confidentiality, integrity, and
availability (or resilience to DoS attacks). Hence, the security for AMI system should satisfy
the requirements as follows:
• Confidentiality: In the AMI, the metrology and consumption information communications
have to meet confidentiality requirements to protect the customer's privacy and business
information. This means physical theft of smart meters to access the stored information,
unauthorized access to the data, as well as customer's access to other customers’ data should
be prevented. At AMI headend, only authorized systems are permitted to access to specific
customer's information.
• Integrity: The AMI system should ensure the integrity of transmitted messages, as the
operation of the AMI is dependent on the integrity of communicated information. Integrity
in AMI means that the transmitted data from the meter to the utility as well as control
commands from the utility to the meter and the received data from smart meters are
maintained and protected from any changes such as malicious modification, insertion,
deletion, or replay. The integrity of data can be ensured by using cryptographic techniques
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to prevent hackers from pretending they are authorized entities and issue commands to
perform their attacks. In AMI, smart meters have to detect cyber‐attacks and ignore all issued
control commands from attacker to protect the integrity of SG.
• Availability: The assurance that any network resources, such as data, bandwidth, and
equipment, will always be available to any authorized entity. One of the important functions
of the availability is to prevent denial‐of‐service (DoS) attacks, energy starvation, and
selfishness. Hence, AMI components should protect against or limit the effects of DoS
attacks. The AMI system should restrict the ability of internal or external users to launch
DoS attacks against other AMI components or networks. Besides, the main reason for
unavailability of data is component failure, such as communication failure (due to interfer‐
ence, cut cables, path degeneration, loss of bandwidth, network traffic, etc.), software
problem, physical damage, or human tampering with the meter.
• Accountability: Also known as nonrepudiation or nondenial. Accountability techniques
prevent either receiver or sender from denying a message by ensuring that undeniable proof
will exist to verify the truthfulness of any claim of an entity. Accountability is specifically
important for billing purpose as well as responses to control signals and in the actual
metrology data. In AMI, the accountability requirement is a major concern, because different
devices are usually owned by different entities, for example, service providers, customers,
and they are manufactured by different vendors. To ensure accountability, time synchro‐
nization across AMI network as well as accurate time stamp of collected data is vital.
Based on the security requirements for AMI system was mentioned, security in AMI is very
complex. Hence, just a single solution is insufficient for securing AMI. The authors in [22]
present the threats to the security in AMI and then they propose some technologies as well as
policies to improve the system's security.
4.3. Security in AMI using key management scheme
A typical AMI involves smart meters, HAN, NAN, WAN, and MDMS. For secure communi‐
cation between these entities, confidentiality, integrity, and authentication should be guaran‐
teed in the first place. Meanwhile, availability is also a critical requirement that should be
fulfilled due to the high availability of electrical power. Besides, the AMI system must
implement intelligent applications, such as dynamic electricity pricing, demand response, and
real‐time measuring/monitoring. Hence, AMI should be able to support different communi‐
cation types (i.e., unicast, multicast and broadcast communications) for both customers and
the utility companies to propagate information between the utility and smart meters [26].
Measured data are usually unicast communication from smart meters to the utility companies.
Meanwhile, electricity pricing information is communicated multicast or broadcast from the
utility to smart meters. Demand response program information is transmitted broadcast to all
customers. As a result, by using the key management scheme for the AMI system, unicast,
multicast, and broadcast communications should be able to securely and efficiently deliver
[20].
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To meet the security requirements for AMI, an underlying key management scheme is needed
to generate and update keys for secure message transmission and authentication. Unfortu‐
nately, existing key management schemes designed for IT systems are simply inapplicable for
AMI infrastructure in SG due to the reasons as follows:
• AMI is a complex heterogeneous system, which includes various entities with different
computing ability, storage, and communication capability. In AMI, the smart meters are
typical resource‐constrained appliances, which have limited computation and storage
capability. Meanwhile, the MDMS has high computing ability and plenty of storage
resources. Hence, AMI utilizes the key management scheme, which not only achieves the
security requirements of the system, but also accommodates this imbalance in its existing
resources.
• Typically, AMI in SG is built based on combining IT systems with electric power system.
Thus, problems of AMI are unique that are not encountered in traditional electric power
system as well as IT systems. For example, electric power service demands the high
availability, which is the same high availability of the security schemes in IT systems. The
availability of electric power service and IT systems is considered as DoS attacks. As a result,
the key management scheme must been designed with mechanisms to protect against DoS
attacks. Additionally, the key management scheme has ability to support various modes of
data transmission used in AMI.
• Because AMI may consist of a huge number of smart meters. Hence, the key management
protocol has to open with scalable ability for such a big system.
Currently, in [26, 27], the authors propose key management schemes in AMI for SG. However,
these schemes cannot completely satisfy the above requirements of security. For example, the
authors in [26] present a new key management scheme for AMI, but this method is vulnerable
to DoS attacks and inefficient in key management for a big system. In [27], the authors propose
the key management scheme using physically unclonable functions to guarantee the security
requirements of the system; however, the method is designed without open protocol with
scalable ability for the big size of AMI. To overcome these problems, a hybrid key management
scheme for AMI is proposed in [20] by integrating public key cryptosystem with symmetric
cryptosystem. In this hybrid scheme, the elliptic curve cryptosystems are utilized to achieve
efficient session key generation and trusted authentication. Besides, to generate and update
group keys efficiently, the authors employ a specially designed key hierarchy.
Based on the security requirements of AMI, the system structure, and required availability, a
key security technology using trusted computing methodologies and public key infrastructure
(PKI) is proposed in [28]. By combining PKI technologies with trusted computing elements,
the method is the most desirable solution for SG security as well as AMI. However, the method
is complex, especially in the big system. To reduce the complexity of the method, the authors
propose a technology utilizing the four major technical elements, namely automated trust
anchor security, PKI standards, SG PKI tools, and certificate attributes. In [29], the authors
complement a novel technical element to reduce the complexity of PKI security, which is device
attestation. The proposed method includes the PKI elements into the overall security archi‐
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tecture to achieve a cost‐effective and comprehensive solution for AMI security in SG. Besides,
the trusted computing elements are utilized to guarantee that a malware cannot to access to
the software processing devices. The main functionality of trusted computing is to allow any
devices, which want to join a grid network, to verify that authorized code runs on that system.
The adoption of strict code signing standards by SG suppliers and operators was also sug‐
gested in [28]. Mechanisms for enforcing such standards have been put forward by the Trusted
Computing Group and have been also well documented and available in the literature. The
works in the literature concluded that security solution in SG requires a holistic method, which
combines trusted computing techniques with PKI technologies based on industry standards.
In the holistic method, PKI technical elements, such as trust anchor security, attribute certifi‐
cates, and certificate lifecycle management tools, are the existing technologies tailored
specifically to result in an optimal solution for SG networks. To achieve the optimal solution
for secure SG networks, the primary step should be taken is to propose a cohesive set of
standards and requirements for AMI security.
The authors in [29] articulated the security threats to transmission and distribution (T&D)
automation systems. They mentioned that vulnerabilities in power T&D automation systems
exist at multiple levels, including components, protocols, and networks. An attack process
involves three steps: access, discovery, and control. First, the attacker gains access to the
SCADA system through a connection with the corporate network or through a virtual private
network (VPN). Subsequently, the attacker studies the behaviors of the system and finally
launches an attack. The authors pointed out that the current security solutions are focused
mainly on information technology (IT) but not on control systems, and that there are different
needs for them, making IT security solutions ineffective. They suggested to decouple the
controls from security in order to make it accessible for legacy systems that do not have
inherent security. Their work is mainly a conjecture without clear evidence or comparison with
other approaches.
5. Challenges and solutions in AMI
Such a complex system undoubtedly presents many challenges. In this section, the challenges
and solutions in AMI are identified in two domains including security and communications
between networks.
5.1. Challenges and solutions in security of AMI
5.1.1. Challenges
5.1.1.1. Difficulty to identify large‐scale catastrophic failures
In AMI security, the primary challenge stems from the high‐level dependence between grid
components, such that seemingly independent random events can aggregated to yield large‐
scale catastrophic failures in the grid. High complexity in AMI increases the probability of
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flaws, and unintended access points increase the possibility of attacks induced failure,
especially in an adversary model, in which attacks are readily replicated, thus propagating the
failures. In addition, new entities, such as electric vehicles and DER, are expected to be
incorporated in the grids. However, researches on security raised up by the incorporations
have received very limited attention. Hence, it is very difficult to identify and address the new
failure modes in such systems before they become large‐scale problems.
5.1.1.2. Dependence between electric grids and communication networks of AMI
We understand the threats to the communication networks of AMI and power grids, and we
understand to some extent how the threats associated with the SG communication infrastruc‐
ture impact on the power grid. However, it is unclear how the threats in the power grids can
affect the communication networks of AMI.
5.1.1.3. Challenge to detect network‐based threats
The most serious challenge comes from the ubiquitous connectivity in the equipment,
software, and controls in AMI. Network‐based threats may propagate quickly to overwhelm
the whole network of AMI. In addition, the universal connectivity and multiple access points
make AMI more vulnerable to attacks (such as DoS). We need to rely on automated detection
schemes to respond to network‐based threats.
5.1.1.4. Intrusion detection, prevention, and recovery for AMI
Typically, DoS is one of the most dangerous attacks against AMI. If such attack cannot be
detected and quarantined early enough, it will risk the failure of the functionality in most
critical infrastructure and threaten AMI. Hence, we need new methods for risk assessment
based on prior knowledge in order not to introduce further delays in the overall system.
Besides, in case that an attack cannot be identified and prevented, appropriate intrusion
recovery techniques must be implemented to remedy the consequences of the attack on the
critical infrastructure of AMI.
5.1.1.5. Key management techniques for AMI
Today, the majority of key management schemes were proposed only for secure communica‐
tions within the SG, to address the issues on key establishment for the communicating entities
within SCADA systems to protect critical messages, such as near‐real‐time information, pricing
signals, and feedback data regarding energy consumption of customers. In fact, very few
studies have been carried out on key management schemes for the AMI. Hence, in the future,
researchers should focus on the proposal of novel key management techniques specifically
designed for the AMI.
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5.1.2. Solutions
5.1.2.1. Security analysis
It is important to develop a risk/security analysis process that can autonomously detect faults
to limit the damages to communications of AM. In addition to the analysis of causes and effects
of different threats on the electric grid, we need to establish comprehensive failure scenarios
that include the impacts of multiple threats simultaneously. The risks include those associated
with interactions among cyberspace and physical systems. It will not be possible to consider
all possible combinations of threats. Consequently, an automated test system of taking into
account different failures (attacks) in both cyberspace and physical systems will be an
important additional source for mapping all of the threats and studying their behaviors.
Contingency analysis is already performed for analyzing the stability of AMI. However, that
will need to be expanded to incorporate the risks due to threats coming from various com‐
munication networks in AMI. More precise detection techniques that use multiple factors for
accurately predicting threats will need to be devised to reduce false‐alarm probability. Based
on the previous risk analysis, the algorithms can autonomously detect the faults in AMI to
limit the damages caused by degraded security performance.
5.1.2.2. Security standards
On the other hand, international security standards and legislations are also needed for
communications in AMI. Currently, there are numerous independent efforts to develop
security standards and legislations. Security standards being developed need to be future‐
proof, considering futuristic applications, operations, and energy markets. Standard test
scenarios need to be developed for the researchers developing the algorithms, as well as for
equipment manufacturers for detecting security attacks and failure scenarios at the interfaces
between power grid and communication networks of AMI. Moreover, we should establish
standardized testing requirements for the security in all applications and protocols of AMI. It
is also essential to create auditing requirements to ensure compliance with security legislations
for utilities, equipment manufacturers, and generators for local, national, and regional
regulatory bodies.
5.5.2.3. Quantum key distribution in AMI
The use of quantum key distribution (QKD) can help improve the security of communications
in an AMI. Quantum communication is an emerging technology with potential applications
to the power grids. QKD has been proposed as an approach to improve the security of
communications between the power grids, and it could be implemented over existing fiber‐
optic channels and free‐space optical communication links, within generation systems and
power distribution networks. Quantum communication employs a fundamentally different
technique from most of traditional communicationtechnologies, and it works based on the
physics of entangled quantum states as a fundamental resource. The classical cyber security
techniques depend on physical protection of communication channels, and they need complex
computational techniques to encrypt transmitted data and protect its confidentiality. The
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observation of quantum communication measurements fundamentally disturbs the system,
alerting the receiver for the changes in the channel. QKD has rapidly matured and is now
providing commercial applications by several companies around the world. Researchers are
exploring its applications in more challenging and interesting scenarios, including AMI. One
potential usage in AMI is quantum location verification. Because today's power system
components tend to be stationary, quantum communication techniques could potentially be
used to improve the security with regard to the identification of the location of a smart meter.
This adds another level of security by ensuring that a smart meter placed at a fixed location in
the power grid is truly at that location and is not being spoofed. There are potentially many
other applications of quantum communication techniques that might become useful to ensure
the security in AMI [1].
5.1.2.4. Cross‐layer design for attacks detection
Cross‐layer design for attacks detection in communications of AMI based on CR technology
is another new research topic. To realize a secure communications of AMI based on CR,
security should prevail every other aspects of the whole system design, and be integrated into
every system component. AMI security includes the protection of both communication
networks and power grids to ensure availability and survivability. The detection techniques
based on higher layer introduce an overhead in the network, which could potentially affect
timely delivery of critical messages in the SG, resulting in instabilities. Thus, our earlier work
proposed a cross‐layer design for primary user emulation attacks detection without burdening
the networks with extra overhead [30]. In this work, to completely identify primary user
emulation attacks and primary users (PU) at PHY layer over multipath Rayleigh fading
channels in mobile CR networks, cross‐layer intelligent learning capability of secondary user
(SU) was exploited to establish radio‐frequency fingerprint (i.e., channel‐tap power) databases
by combining the accuracy and capability of higher layer authentication [31] with a quick
detection algorithm on PHY layer [32].
5.2. Challenges and solutions in communications
5.2.1. Challenges
Depending on the characteristics of HAN, NAN, and WAN, different communication
technologies are utilized efficiently. For example, in a small area as customers’ home, HANs
use ZigBee, Bluetooth, or PLC to communicate data between devices. Besides, WiMAX, or
WiFi is utilized to build NAN based on wireless mesh topology, and fiber optics or broadband
cellular networks are adopted for WANs. However, these traditional communication methods
bear the high costs for investment, operation, and maintenance, which are incapable of meeting
the requirements and challenges in SG. It has been recognized that CR is a promising tech‐
nology to construct a more advanced communication infrastructure for SG. By using dynamic
spectrum access technique, CR networks solve the problem of scarce spectrum and poor
allocation of traditional spectrum policies, and support increasing demand for applications
based on wireless communications in SG [33]. In [34], the authors propose the use of CR
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technology to address the communication requirements, standardization, and security
problems of SG communications. There are many benefits brought in by introducing CR into
SG. In [35], by using CR technology, it can support energy‐ and spectrum‐efficient designs, as
well as avoiding interference and adapting the data throughput, i.e., CR communication over
license‐free bands is employed in the HANs to coordinate heterogeneous wireless technolo‐
gies, whereas CR communications over licensed bands is employed in the NANs and WAN
to dynamically access unoccupied spectrum opportunities [36].
Moreover, to address aforementioned problems in AMI communications infrastructure
(Section 3.2), CR technology can be suitable for AMI communication system. In [37], the
authors proposed to enhance a routing protocol for low power and lossy networks (RPL) for
CR‐enabled AMI networks, i.e., CORPL [38]. This protocol provides novel modifications to
RPL to address the routing challenges in CR environments, such as reliable and low latency
data delivery, along with protecting the PUs and meeting the requirements of secondary
networks. Results show that CORPL improves the reliability of the network while reducing
harmful interferences to PUs by up to 50%, as well as reducing the deadline violation proba‐
bility for delay sensitive traffic. The authors in [39] proposed to use a cloud computing data
center as a central communication and optimization infrastructure supporting a CR network
of AMI smart meters that is called netbook advance metering infrastructure (Net‐AMI). The
proposed system is extensible and can easily handle thousands of variations in power systems,
communication protocols, control, and energy optimization protocols. By placing new CR
antennas on existing cellular antenna towers, vast geographical coverage can be achieved.
Moreover, remote software upgrades allow modifications of existing networks components,
AMI interfaces, and Net‐AMI smart meters in a flexible and amorphous manner using CR
technology. In [40], the authors modeled the AMI as a SU in CR‐based SG systems based on
the IEEE802.22 wireless regional area network (WRAN) [41], which supports the unlicensed
operation of SUs with spectrum sensing technologies in VHF/UHF TV broadcast bands from
54 to 862 MHz. The authors also investigated a beam‐forming method based on minimum
mean squared error (MMSE) to suppress self‐interferences in smart meter channels. In [42],
the authors proposed a CR‐based SG using wireless access communication of line and
substation monitoring system addressing the system implementation issues, such as commu‐
nication efficiency and energy supply in AMI.
As part of the end‐user facilities, AMIs can also be efficiently realized with the help of CR
technology. For example, by using CR technology, AMI can self‐configure and deploy in
coexisting wireless networks at various customer premises easily. Based on the spectrum‐
aware capability of CR, smart meters and equipment in AMI can be easily deployed at the
remote sides to achieve reliable and seamless communications between AMIs and the control
center of utility company. The cognitive sensor network (CSN) nodes designed with consid‐
eration of energy and price limitations in remote monitoring can be the main components for
efficient realization of wireless AMI.
However, when we apply CR technology in communications of AMI, we have to face some
challenges.
(1) Communications between cognitive HANs and NANs
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The challenges to implement communications between CR‐based HANs and NANs can be
identified as follows.
• The lack of spectrum holes of licensed bands for data transmissions from smart devi‐
ces: In CR‐based SG networks, the communications between HANs and NANs are realized
by connecting HAN gateways (HGWs) and NAN gateway (NGW). A NGW connects many
HGWs from various HANs using licensed bands in an opportunistic manner. However, a
SG system generates vast amount of data coming from smart devices. Hence, it might
happen that there are no enough spectrum holes of licensed bands to be used for the data
transmissions, as there might be times or locations where vacant bands are not available.
Moreover, a great challenge in HANs is to internetwork various customer equipment
provided by different manufacturers using different standards such as WiFi, ZigBee,
WRAN, and Bluetooth.
• Delay of traffics and real‐time capability: Bidirectional data transmissions between NANs
and HANs must meet real‐time requirements. The data transmissions involve many types
of data, which have different levels of time requirements. For example, the real‐time data
exchanges between IEDs and other power devices in a large distributed area should ensure
that all decisions are made by the control centers in a timely manner, such as controlling or
monitoring data, so that demand response can be realized in the customer ends; whereas
some other data are transmitted in a periodic manner, such as power consumption data of
households. The various types of data also bring in a major challenging issue due to low‐
speed transmission characteristics and inherent sensing delays of CR. Moreover, the SU in
CR must continuously monitor radio spectrum usage to give the precedence to the PU.
Therefore, the random interruption of SU traffic will unavoidably cause packet losses and
delays in sending SU data. As a result, the communications in a CR network are normally
unreliable, and it is a great challenge to support real‐time applications.
• AMI self‐configuration: HANs connect many smart devices to achieve optimum energy
consumption and to implement demand response and AMIs. Smart meters, energy man‐
agement systems (EMSs), and smart devices installed in all customer premises are part of
the AMI. The AMI will enable these smart devices to communicate with the utility operated
control centers to control their operations at a given time and thus implement demand‐side
management for the utility. However, the number and characteristics of the smart meters
and devices change randomly according to the preferences of customers, who can install
new smart meters and devices or remove old smart appliances in an unpredictable manner.
Hence, the AMI must have self‐configuration ability to ensure online update and effectively
monitor the random changes of these smart appliances.
(2) Communications between cognitive NANs and WANs
The challenges to implement communications between cognitive NANs and WANs are
identified in the sequel.
• Limited WAN coverage area due to the use of ISM bands: The communications between
NANs and WANs are built up based on cognitive base stations. Hence, there is also the
problem of a shortage of licensed bands for opportunistic access. However, the ISM bands
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are not suitable for the communications between NANs and WANs because the coverage
area of WAN is larger, whereas the ISM bands are suitable for short‐range transmissions.
• Service reliability using TV white space (TVWS) to connect NANs and WANs: Another
serious challenge using TVWS to connect NANs and WANs is service reliability. In spite of
dynamic frequency switching and multi‐channel utilization, which can solve the reliability
problems, the SU using TVWS is considered as a fundamental issue, in which the SU have
to postpone its connections with TVWS if it detects the existence of an incoming PU. New
methods to mitigate the unreliability caused by inherent cognitive characteristics of SG
communications in the licensed bands remains to be proposed.
• Scalability: The scalability feature of WAN connections using wired communication
technologies in AMI is limited due to high maintenance and installation costs. Hence,
wireless communication technologies are suitable for wide area communications in AMI
because of its flexibility. However, to achieve scalability in wireless technologies, we have
to add more wireless routers and access points to AMI network, so the installation costs will
increase.
5.2.2. Solutions
5.2.2.1. Communications between cognitive HANs and NANs
In order to facilitate the communications between cognitive HANs and NANs, we suggest to
use the following techniques.
• Hybrid spectrum access method to extend the coverage of WANs: As spectrum holes of
the licensed bands may not be enough to transmit a massive amount of data, the commu‐
nications between HANs and NANs may temporarily operate in the license‐free bands (i.e.,
ISM bands) with lower communication rates. In the method, data transmissions between
HGWs and a NGW are considered using a hybrid spectrum access. As a result, the com‐
munications between HANs and NANs can improve reliability. As using hybrid spectrum
access, the HGWs operate as cognitive nodes in the communication networks and they
employ the spectrum sensing method to find vacant spectrum bands. However, if spectrum
sensing time of HGWs is too long, then the rest of time to transmit data is short, so the
throughput of the networks will be reduced. To solve the problem of HGWs, a scheme to
decide when to stop spectrum sensing and when to access ISM bands was proposed in [43]
based on the expected throughput performance. In this case, ISM bands are introduced as
backup bands for communications to improve service reliability of SG applications. If this
condition happens frequently, more NGWs can be installed to utilize space diversity.
• CR‐based AMI self‐configuration: As part of the end‐user facilities, AMIs can also be
efficiently realized with the help of CR technology. By using CR technology, AMI can self‐
configure in order to coexist wireless networks at different customer premises. With the
spectrum‐aware communication capability, smart meters and equipment in AMI can be
easily deployed at the remote sides to achieve reliable and seamless communications
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between AMIs and the control center of utility company. This is a major opportunity for
efficient implementation of wireless AMI in remote monitoring.
5.1.1.1. Communications between cognitive NANs and WANs
To ensure reliable and scalable communications between cognitive NANs and WANs, we
identify the approaches as listed in the sequel.
• WAN coverage area extension to improve reliability: First, we can use hybrid access modes
of licensed and leased bands to extend the coverage area of WANs and improve service
reliability. The utilities can lease some radio bands, which are used as backup bands, at a
low cost from a telecommunication operator. The hybrid access mode between the leased
and licensed bands is intelligently scheduled and seamlessly switched, so that it can improve
quality of service (QoS) of data communications, thus benefiting both utilities and users. In
this sense, NGWs operate as cognitive nodes, which use spectrum sensing methods to find
vacant spectrum bands in communication networks of AMI. After given certain sensing
times, the NGWs will choose leased spectrum bands to communicate data with base station,
whereas these NGWs still find vacant spectrum bands to use them opportunistically. When
the data transmission rate of the leased spectrum bands is higher than that of the cognitive
licensed spectrum bands, SUs will stop spectrum sensing and access the leased bands to
transmit collected data. On the contrary, if the transmission rate of the leased bands is lower
than that of cognitive licensed bands, then SUs will find vacant spectrums and access the
cognitive licensed bands to transmit data for achieving a higher throughput. However, the
number of the leased spectrum bands is very limited and they also serve as backup bands
in emergency situations to transmit critical data. Hence, the NGWs have to spectrum sensing
periodically to release the leased spectrum bands once a vacant spectrum band is identified.
In NANs, the available unoccupied spectrum bands are scarce in urban areas, whereas
abundant in rural areas, because the amount of data traffic in urban areas is much larger
than that in rural areas. Therefore, the leased bands, which are distributed to a NAN in
urban areas, should be more than that distributed to a NAN in rural areas. Moreover, a
leased spectrum band can be shared by several NANs without causing interference to each
other if the service area of a WAN is very large. Similarly, the leased bands are utilized as
backup bands for communications to improve service reliability of SG applications. Besides,
we can use cooperative communications to extend the coverage and improve service
reliability. Other available wireless and wireline technologies, such as wireless cellular
networks, internet, and fiber optics, should also interoperate with cognitive NANs and
WANs to make SG more resilient, scalable, and reliable in an economical manner. For
example, currently, the mobile communications have been implemented via both cellular
networks and IPv6 mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), so that we can utilize the MANETs
to transmit noncritical data.
• Scalability: The CR technology creates an opportunity to increase scalability with a low
cost. For example, IEEE 802.22 standard has unique features, such as geo‐location, spectrum
sensing, and intra‐system coexistence for CR‐based operations. The standard operating in
TVWSs from 54 to 862 MHz permits broadband wireless access to wide range rural areas
Smart Metering Technology and Services – Inspirations for Energy Utilities56
without interference with the PUs. Using IEEE 802.22 standard, coverage area of base station
can be 33 km if customer premises equipment operates at power level of 4 W. When higher
power levels are allowed, the coverage area can be increased to 100 km [34].
6. Conclusions and future visions of AMI
AMI based on smart meters in SG has been identified, and their state‐of‐the‐art research
activities were reviewed. In addition, the issues on security of AMI in SG have also been
discussed. Future SG should comprise intelligent monitoring systems to keep a track of all
electricity flows and a huge amount of collected data from smart devices as well. Hence, it
must be flexible and resilient to accommodate new requirements in an economical manner. To
achieve these goals, communications in AMI based on CR will certainly play an important role
for infrastructures of the SG. Moreover, by using AMI, SG can support real‐time traffic delivery
with stringent the quality of service requirements of real‐time applications. The major
challenges on evolutional path toward SG and solutions are also identified in this chapter.
With AMI, SG should preserve its interoperable and secured communications within a hybrid
system where both new and legacy grids coexist. Therefore, AMI in SG should be built up on
open protocols with a common notion of security and standard. Besides, advanced research
topics, such as artificial neuron network and Fuzzy theory, can also apply to the intelligent
monitoring systems to improve the ability of AMI. Moreover, accurate state estimation
methods need to propose in the future to detect blind false data injection attacks because
accurate state estimation is of paramount importance to maintain normal operations of AMI.
Typically, a bad data detection system is used to ensure the integrity of state estimation and
to filter faulty measurements introduced by device malfunctions or malicious attacks. How‐
ever, in [44], we prove that blind false data injection attacks using the principal component
analysis approximation method without the knowledge of Jacobian matrix and the assumption
regarding the distribution of state variables can bypass the bad data detection system to inject
fault data in the system. In the future, the architecture of AMI not only aims at seamless
integration of various existing smart metering products, but also other software systems used
by power utilities (i.e., outage, energy and distribution management systems, etc.). Hence, new
solutions aim at enabling flexible integration of metering devices and their grouping in form
of virtual meters through hierarchically organized software structures and flexible standardized
communication interfaces.
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